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Abstract

Winning the New Iraq -Counterinsurgency Operations
The thesis of this paper is the United States is winning in Iraq. Our The U.S. is currently in the opening round as Iraqi Security Forces are trained and a legitimate government is formed. Third, measuring our efforts in Iraq -includes developing and measuring critical criteria to determine if we are on the road to success in Iraq. Establishing legitimate governments, professional security forces, and targeting the population through civil projects are critical parts of the road to success. This road to success has to be navigated in a complex environment of religion, culture and global terrorism issues. Being able to properly measure your progress on this road is critical.
Finally, given our criteria, what steps can we take to continue our operations in Iraq? In the end, transforming Iraq from a dangerous place threatened by a deadly insurgency into a free democratic nation with a new representative government and professional security forces.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the question -is the U.S. winning the war These national and military goals are nested to provide guidance to military commanders; they remain unchanged. The U.S. is pursuing a strategy to support the establishment of an Iraqi representative government that, through stability based on a democratic system, will have positive second and third order effects across the region.
The diagram below provides a summary of the strategic end state and the broad issues that affect the timely accomplishment of the end state. 9 Ibid. p.2. 10 Ibid. p.2. 11 Rumsfeld, 1.
The result of the initial military OIF actions (phases 1-3) was goal 1 successfully completed and goals 2 and 3 poorly planned and executed. The result was the conditions were set for an insurgency. Today, the stated goals remain unchanged; the question remains, is the U.S. succeeding in our current status to accomplish those goals.
INSURGENCY PHASES
The second step in determining whether the Iraqi government and security forces Goal 2: Result of OIF was the Iraqi military melted into the population, bureaucratic managers failed to come to work, and security forces failed to execute their jobs -result was wide spread looting which crippled a national infrastructure already in a shambles and bureaucratic systems (local governments, police, water and electric companies) ceased to exist or were terribly ineffective.
Goal 3: Building an Iraqi political system was poorly planned by the US Administration -no national level organization was organized to meet this daunting challenge Phase 2 and 3. Each day the Iraqi Security forces are improving and taking offensive action against the insurgents but the insurgents are still a threat to the new government.
The new government must demonstrate it will fairly represent all segments of the population -this factor cannot be completely demonstrated until a fair constitution is approved and a new national election is completed.
CRITICAL CRITERIA AND METRICS
The third step in answering the question -are the U.S and coalition forces winning in Iraq -is to develop and apply critical criteria -measure the current situation to determine whether if the U.S forces are going in the right direction. This step is divided into four parts. Part one is an examination of reoccurring counterinsurgency lessons learned. Part two is applying these lessons learned to Iraq using a doctrinal 17 Ibid. p.37. 18 Ibid. p.37. 19 Ibid. p.38.
approach. Part three is a review of the Iraq diversity -Shi'a, Kurds and Sunni. Part four is then the transforming of the information into a "Winning the New Iraq" construct based on a measurable actionable strategy.
Lessons Learned
After studying historical cases of counter insurgency and counter guerrilla operations, several recurring lessons are worth noting here.
-Focus on the population -Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannon in their book, Counter Guerrilla Operations The Philippine Experience, state one "approach to counter guerrilla operations, one that might be called 'stealing their thunder'. As the name implies, the idea is to beat the guerrilla at his own game, to try to attract more support from the civilians in the areas of operations than can the guerrilla, while at the same time winning combat superiority." 20 -Moral high ground -Valeriano and Bohannon also state, "forces on the ground demonstrate their own moral superiority; they must find ways to dramatize their concern for the people." 21 -Security and support -The US Army Counterinsurgency Planning Guide states, "Counterinsurgency operations seek to create an environment of security and popular trust which will permit orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals." 22 -Political, psychological and economic actions -The Planning Guide also states, "the effort must aim at denying the insurgent his bases of popular support by a combination of political, psychological, and economic actions while at the same time concentrating offensive counter guerrilla efforts toward neutralization of the guerrilla threat." 23 -Effective legitimate government -Blanfarb and Tanham in their book, Who Will Win? provide several lessons learned on the actions of the government. First, "all military operations will be wasted if success cannot be exploited by an effective civil government." 24 Second, "military civil actions help but cannot solve the problem. It is the civil government which will have to maintain them but does it have the complete staff to do this." 25 Third, "the people are the target -meaning that the purpose of the activity, or much of it, was to affect popular attitudes and not simply to kill the enemy." 
Doctrinal Approach
Below are listed the generic lessons learned and applied to Iraq using a doctrinal approach -decisive, shaping, and sustaining forces -Decisive Force -the legitimate Iraqi Government that fairly represents the entire population and adequately addresses the minority grievances so that the insurgency is defeated.
-Shaping Force -the security forces (police and army) set the conditions so that the legitimate governments (local, regional and national) can operate effectively. The ultimate goal is a police force capable of maintaining internal security.
-Sustaining Force -the sustaining force maintains the momentum. The government demonstrates over an extended period that it is legitimate and can provide for the people and is best for the nation. This force has a major part in maintaining government control over areas where the insurgents have been defeated.
Iraq Diversity
Before transforming the lessons learned and key tasks into metrics, it is important to understand the critical Iraqi conditions. Iraq is a complex nation and society. In Iraq there are three primary groups that directly effect the accomplishment of the national The third group is the Sunni Arabs, the former dominant group who controlled the country by controlling the military, political appointments, and the nation's wealth.
Clearly, this group provides the insurgents the large majority of their manpower, funding, logistical support and safe havens. The Iraqi political leaders and security forces must continue to target the Sunni Arabs with the goal of convincing them to become stakeholders in a new Iraq. The Sunnis must be convinced through words and actions that their lives will actually be better than when they held absolute power. Operations should be designed to demonstrate that the insurgents cannot win against the Iraqi/US coalition.
Metrics
Due to religious and cultural differences, the US military and civilian leadership will never be able to appeal directly to the Iraqi people. Attached are examples of metrics that support the measurement of the stated tasks. The U.S. is on the right road, but a lot of hard work must still be accomplished.
Most of this work must be completed by the Iraqis themselves.
WAY AHEAD
The building blocks for success are slowly but effectively being put in place to Provided below is a synchronization matrix for Winning the New Iraq. We must remain focused on efficient use of our resources along these functional lines. The end result is an effective democratic Iraqi government that answers to all the Iraqi people.
In closing, I want to end on a quote from Natan Sharansky's book, The
Case for Democracy. Sharnasky states, "Moral clarity provides us with a place to stand, a reference point from where to leverage our talents, ideas, and energies to 
